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i
Abstract
The present study sought to examine the factors that most distinguish fare evaders who
do not pay their fines and fail to appear in court from fare evaders who pay their fines and
appear in court. The relationship between prior criminal history and fare evasion
offenders who do not pay their fines and fail to appear in court is also explored. A sample
of 24,646 defendants who received a citation for fare evasion while riding the Tri-Met
transit system in Portland, Oregon were divided into two groups of fare evaders who pay
and appear in court and fare evaders who do not pay and fail to appear in court. An
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to find the average differences between
the groups. To examine the relationship between criminal history and fare evasion
defendants who do not pay and fail to appear in court, the criminal histories of a
subsample of 400 defendants from both fare evader groups were analyzed. ANOVAs
were conducted on the 400 defendants to evaluate the differences in criminal histories
between the pay and no pay groups. Also, a logistic regression was conducted to
investigate the factors most associated with non-payment and failure to appear.
Furthermore, a qualitative analysis on defendants who did not pay and failed to appear
was conducted using a criminal records search. Results show that there is a significant
difference between the no pay and pay groups across all variables, but prior criminal
history, homelessness, and repeat fare evasion are the most distinguishable factors. The
findings suggest that fare evasion fines are ineffective among fare evaders who have
criminal histories, are homeless, and are repeat evaders. Further research on this
population is needed to improve fare evasion policy.
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Introduction
The tri-county area of Multnomah, Washington, and Clackamas in Oregon has a
light rail transit system referred to as the “MAX”. The Tri-Met MAX system is called an
“open” system in that there are no turnstiles or ticket collectors to ensure riders have paid
the appropriate fare before entering a platform or getting on a train. In 1982, Gerald Fox
conducted a preliminary study on the Tri-Met MAX system in which he analyzed the
costs and benefits of the new self-service fare collection program (SSFC). The SSFC
allowed riders to purchase their own fares through machines and did not require driver
checking of fare during boarding. The SSFC was first used in Europe and became the
conventional method known as the “honor” system. The North American transit systems
began to adopt the self-service collection program for the advantages such as the
speediness of daily operation, effective operation, improved schedules, and convenience
for passengers (Fox, 1982). Though the possibility for fare evasion increased with SSFC,
revenue could be made from fines or citations given to fare evaders by fare inspectors
(Fox, 1982). New concerns for fare evasion evoked the emphasis for a need of a viable
fare enforcement program from researchers like Fox. In response, Boyd, Martini,
Rickard, and Russell (1989) reviewed a fare evasion and non-compliance “simple” model
in an attempt to calculate the appropriate need of patrolling fare inspectors which was
based on fare evader behavior, their perceptions on the possibility of getting caught
without proof of payment, the actual possibility of getting caught, and the cost of evasion
inspection. Tri-Met, which oversees public transportation in the tri-county area, primarily
uses fare enforcement officers (non-sworn security officers) to conduct sweeps of riders
on trains and while exiting trains. If riders are caught by officers with no fare or
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inappropriate fare, they can be given a warning, a ticket, or an exclusion (e.g. for repeat
offenders). Local police also participate in some fare evasion incidents, usually at the
behest of fare evasion officers and can also issue tickets, but they are most often involved
in exclusion orders. The cost of a fare evasion fine at the time of this study was 175
dollars (Renauer, 2017). One major purpose for Tri-Met’s use of fare evasion patrolling
officers is for random inspections or patrol in an attempt to deter riders from taking
advantage of the open and “honor” MAX system. Riders receiving a fare evasion ticket
must appear in court to pay their fine or mail in their fine payment. A recent study
conducted by Renauer (2017) analyzed Tri-Met fare evasion data and results showed that
only 30% of fare evaders show up to court and pay 100% of their fine. These results call
into question the effectiveness of using deterrence and fine-based models to ensure riders
“honor” open system transit lines such as the MAX. Failing to appear in court for fare
evasion and not paying fines yields great personal consequences including arrest
warrants, applied maximum fine amounts, and the possibility of debt collection. Why are
these personal costs not impacting the majority of fare evaders? The current study seeks
to examine why some fare evaders are showing up to court and paying their tickets while
others fail to appear in court (FTA) and have made no payments. The current study
explores whether different demographic factors differentiate these two groups of fare
evaders. Particular attention in this study is given to fare evaders’ recent criminal
histories and how the general criminal history of evaders along with other factors may
have an influence on court appearances and payment decisions.
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Literature Review
Recent literature has focused on how to reduce fare evasion more effectively. In
order for deterrence-based policies to be more effective, we must first understand the
theory and factors that underlie these policies to improve their implementation and
effectiveness. However, there is little scholarship in Criminology and Criminal Justice
journals focused specifically on the topic of fare evasion defendants who fail to appear in
court and do not pay their fines. The behavior this study is trying to explain is not fare
evasion itself, but the act of appearing in court and paying fare evasion fines or not.
Criminology and Criminal Justice theory can help explain why fare evasion defendants
and repeat offenders do not appear in court or pay their fines. Understanding the
characteristics of fare evasion defendants and why they fail to appear and fail to pay their
fines will inform fare evasion enforcement policy making.
Theoretical Framework
Deterrence. Renauer’s 2017 study found that 52% of fare evasion defendants
using the MAX do not to pay fines and fail to appear in court. Relevant defendant factors
must be examined to explain why deterrence, enforcement policies, and the
accompanying costs to fare evaders do not appear to be working. In order to prevent
future criminal action, deterrent-based policies use the threat of government sanctions to
increase compliance. Intended to serve as a deterrent, Tri-Met fare evasion citations are
enforced by the Multnomah County Circuit Court which imposes sanctions on fare
evaders. General deterrence theory suggests that future crime could be prevented through
threats of certain, severe, and speedy punishment (Nagin, 2013).
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Deterrence theory argues that individuals will refrain from committing crime if
the punishment is certain (Nagin, 2013). When fare evasion defendants fail to appear in
court and pay their fines, there is strong certainty of defendants being identified because
court and payment records are regularly updated to incorporate the outcomes of
scheduled court dates and payment collections. Fare evasion defendants could certainly
have a warrant for their arrest or have unpaid fines turned over to collection agencies,
further impacting their criminal record or credit history. However, certainty of
punishment is also low because if defendants fail to appear and do not pay, local
authorities are not actively searching for such defendants given the low severity of fare
evasion cases. In other words, even when offenders do not pay, there may not be any
repercussion for nonpayment (Ruback & Bergstorm, 2006). Only in the case that the
defendant is at the hand of the courts and police for a subsequent crime can the defendant
be punished for previously not paying and failing to appear. There is some research that
suggests that certainty of punishment is likely the strongest of deterrent factors (Decker,
Wright, & Logie, 1993).
The severity of punishment is also a component of deterrence where individuals
will refrain from committing crime if the cost is considered to be severe (Nagin, 2013).
Tri-Met currently has one of the highest penalties for fare evasion compared to other
transit systems across the nation with the fine for fare evasion being 35 times higher than
the cost of fare to begin with (Renauer, 2017). For deterrence to be effective, the
punishment, in this case a fine, has to be painful and costly enough that a defendant
would reconsider failing to appear in court or not paying their fines because the personal
costs outweigh the benefits. Again, failing to appear in court and not paying could also be

5
severe considering possibilities of an arrest warrant, perhaps resulting in a short trip to
jail, and potential referral of fines to a collection agency which can impact credit rating.
However, Decker, Wright, and Logie’s 1993 study of active burglars concluded that
increasing severity of punishment (i.e., time in prison) for burglary and robbery, “would
likely have little effect on active street criminals largely because such an initiative does
not alleviate the need for money, nor does it objectively reduce opportunities for crime”
(p. 262). If those who do not show up to court and do not pay fare evasion fines are
persons of significantly smaller financial means, it is unlikely increased monetary
punishment is going to propel them to behave differently. For some it would be virtually
impossible to pay such fines without gainful employment.
The speed or celerity of punishment also factors into deterrence. If punishment is
swift and prompt, it is possible that the deterrent effect will be stronger. After being
issued a fare evasion citation, defendants are issued a court date which is usually about a
month after the citation is issued according to Multnomah County Circuit Court data.
Differences in the timelines of expected court appearances could also influence a
defendant’s ability or willingness to appear in court. It appears the speed at which fare
evaders are actually punished is slow given the time delays to court dates and the
unlikelihood that the court will aggressively seek to track down defendants who miss
court and do not pay fines.
In contrast to general deterrence, specific deterrence addresses the failed
preventive effect of general deterrence by threat of punishment. Specific deterrence refers
to the deterrent effect after reoffending and actually experiencing certain, severe, and
swift punishment (Nagin, 2013). In theory, defendants who have been caught and cited
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for fare evasion would be specifically deterred after experiencing the punishment of
being fined and being ordered to appear in court. Nagin’s 2013 review of deterrence has
shown that there is little empirical evidence that specific deterrence has an effect. Instead,
specific deterrence has shown an unaffected or increased reoffending effect. Repeat fare
evaders have shown that specific deterrence has little or no effect on preventing future
crimes as those who chose to offend and reoffend likely disregard punishment or
repercussions.
Social Bond and Stake in Conformity. Hirschi’s 1969 social bond theory
suggests that when social bonds are weak or broken, it increases the likelihood of crime
and delinquency occurrences. An individual’s relationships to conventional society are
otherwise known as social bonds. Hirschi (1969) identified four types of social bonds:
attachment, commitment, involvement, and belief. Attachment is the emotional
relationship between individuals. Commitment is the investment in educational or
occupational success. Involvement is an individual’s participation in conventional
activities. Belief is the embrace of the moral validity of society and conventional norms.
The stronger an individual’s social bonds, the more likely they are to refrain from crime
and follow conventional norms. This theory builds from Durkheim’s idea that conformity
is established by society (Hirschi, 1969). Stake in conformity, at the most basic level,
suggests that an individual has more to lose by engaging in deviant behavior when they
are more invested in conventional society (Toby, 1957). These stakes will essentially
influence decision making when there are potential consequences to consider (Briar &
Piliavin, 1965). According to Nagin & Paternoster (1994), having personal capital is a
form of having social bonds and they are associated with the deterrent effect. Similar to
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the rational thinking logic, defendants who are deterred view the risks of failing to appear
in court too costly because they are incentivized by their investment into conventional
society. Investment into society might be in the form of employment or family. With fare
evasion, defendants who do not pay and fail to appear might have less stake in
conformity or personal social capital. Having no stake in conformity might also be a
factor in repeat offending even after being cited once before. Fare evaders who are
houseless, have long criminal records, are unemployed, and are suffering from mental
health and addiction crises would have very low stakes in conforming, causing them to
not consider or care about the consequences of court attendance and payment of fines.
Cumulative Disadvantage. There are many factors that may make defendants
not pay their fines and fail to appear in court. As previously mentioned, some defendants
may be struggling with hardships such as homelessness or substance abuse. Defendants
who pertain to some of these disadvantaged societal groups may have not been able to
appear or pay because of the hardships previously accumulated. Criminal records
represent a societal disadvantage that can have “cumulative” impacts on one’s life as it is
predictive of other disadvantages like unemployment and housing difficulties. Similarly,
personal issues with substance abuse can have cascading cumulative disadvantages
related to mental health development because of addiction, unemployment, and
houselessness. These disadvantages compound over time making it more difficult for
someone to be pulled back to normalcy. Hence, fare evasion defendants who have
criminal records, are homeless, or have problems with substance abuse, are likely to not
pay and fail to appear in court due to the related cumulative disadvantages. It is important
to recognize that obeying laws, rules, and regulations can become difficult when
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individuals are restricted by hardships such as lack of employment or housing and even
mental health and substance abuse (Petersilia, 2003). Ruback, Knoth, Gladfelter, and
Lantz (2018) conducted a study to examine whether changes in economic sanctions
would increase likelihood of payment and reduce repeat offending. Ruback et al. (2018)
found that individuals who paid some to all of their fines were likely to have higher
incomes. Payment of fines may be associated with defendants who hold an occupation
and have financial means and therefore are likely to not have a criminal record or not
report a homeless shelter address. The effects of policy changes on the poor are a more
recent concern when deciding to set higher fine amounts (Cares & Hayes, 2018). Past
literature has found that imposing high economic sanctions could have negative or
adverse effects because individuals will turn to deviant behavior in order to have the
means to pay or because they add to existing financial hardships (Ruback et al., 2018).
Researchers recognize that financial hardships possibly determine whether an individual
will pay their fare evasion fine and appear in court or not (Ruback et al., 2006).
Rational Choice. Rational thinking is also a principle that influences deterrence.
For deterrence to be effective, potential offenders must weigh the costs and benefits of
their actions and ultimately decide to refrain from committing crime for fear of
punishment (Nagin & Paternoster, 1994). Following that logic, fare evasion defendants
who appear in court and pay their fines perceive the costs of failing to appear and not
paying to outweigh the benefits therefore being deterred. Defendants who do not pay and
fail to appear may believe that the benefit of not having to pay outweighs the risk of
being sanctioned. For some defendants who do not pay and fail to appear, the risks and
costs may not even be considered. If defendants are struggling with mental health,
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homelessness, or drug and alcohol abuse, then the costs may be irrelevant to them.
Combined, these components and principles that influence deterrence can be examined to
understand the factors that lead defendants to appear in court and pay or not.
In the rational choice perspective, crime involves motivation and the offender’s choice to
commit crime in any given situational opportunity (Lilly, Cullen, & Ball, 2015).
Following the assumption that these individuals are rational and will react to
environmental situations, it could be argued that offenders are committing crime to
satisfy their monetary needs or status (Lilly et al., 2015; Nagin & Paternoster, 1994).
With fare evasion, offenders who have been cited may have put their monetary needs
over a citation. Once a fare evader has been cited, they must rationally decide if
appearing in court and paying their fines is more beneficial than not paying and not
appearing in court. Rather than appearing in court and having their fines reduced,
offenders who fail to appear risk higher fine ranges. A key aspect is that offenders may
not know that by appearing in court, their fine can be drastically reduced from $175 to
$95 (Renauer, 2017). Ultimately, unpaid fines could lead to heavier costs (e.g. higher
interest with a collection agency or court warrants). Perceptual deterrence offers an
explanation of crime arguing that offenders choose to engage in crime when the benefits
outweigh the costs (Pratt, Cullen, Blevins, Daigle, & Madensen, 2011). Perceptual
deterrence also offers a solution to crime arguing that by making the costs (legal action
and penalties) less appealing, offenders will refrain from committing crime because the
costs will outweigh the benefits. For example, the fare evasion and non-compliance
model that Boyd et al. (1989) presented is founded on fare evader behavior and
perceptions which are influenced by a fare evader’s rationalization of the cost and benefit
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of getting caught and penalized. However as previously mentioned, for some fare evasion
defendants who are struggling with hardships such as having no occupation, being
homeless, and substance abuse, rationality and cost benefit analyses are compromised.
Disadvantaged defendants might perceive little to no costs for not paying fines and
failing to appear in court.
Research on Economic Sanctions and Fare Evasion
Past research has examined if payment of economic sanctions is significantly
related to lower rates of recidivism. A study conducted by Ruback, Knoth, Gladfelter,
and Lantz (2018) tested whether changes in economic sanctions would increase payment
of fines and in turn lower recidivism. By using a prior experiment, conducting a survey of
128 offenders, and collecting local arrest data, the authors found that offenders who paid
their fines in full were less likely to recidivate than those who paid little to none. Results
showed that offenders who were not rearrested were more likely to have made payments
toward their fines or paid in full. Results also suggested that those offenders who made
no payments were likely to have committed a property crime as their most serious
offense. Therefore, fare evasion defendants who did not pay their fines are more likely to
be defendants who also have a criminal record and are repeat offenders in the present
study. Previous offenses revealed by defendant criminal records in the current study’s
sample might be a predictive factor for nonpayment.
A 2006 qualitative study conducted by Ruback, Hoskins, Cares, and Feldmeyer
sought to understand the factors of defendant nonpayment of fines and fees. Survey
responses from 122 offenders who were sentenced to pay economic sanctions showed
that paying economic sanctions would contribute to financial hardships such as inability
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to provide for a family. Responses indicated that among offenders who were ordered to
pay economic sanctions, most did not find the procedure to be fair. Other explanations for
nonpayment were disagreement with the sanction rationale, beliefs of unfairness, and
lack of comprehension. The more prominent explanation for nonpayment was that
offenders did not have the financial resources to pay their fines and fees. Ultimately, the
total amount of economic sanctions and payment amounts toward fees were strong
indicators of ability and willingness to pay.
Previous Literature on Predicting and Profiling Fare Evasion
There has been a growing body of fare evasion literature that attempts to
understand fare evasion, predict fare evader profiles, and that makes recommendations to
decrease fare evasion regarding economic sanctions. Cools et al. (2018) conducted a
study based in Northern Belgium that aimed to identify socio-demographic factors that
predict fare evasion by administering an online survey. The online survey was taken by
636 respondents and contained questions about general public transportation, their
specific transport situation, and socio-economic variables. Responses were analyzed
through a logistic regression and results showed that the average fare evader is often
male, 25 years old or younger, and more likely to find penalty prices to be high. Cools et
al. (2018) also found that fare evaders who think the chances of being inspected are high
are less likely to commit fare evasion. These results are consistent with the idea that fare
evaders are likely rationalizing their decisions to fare evade by weighing the risk and
probability of getting caught.
Barbino, Salis, and Useli (2015) also conducted a study which sought to identify
determinants in the fare evader profile by using interview responses of 2,177 Italian
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transit passengers regarding socio-demographic factors, travel behavior, and knowledge
of fare evasion. A logistic regression and correlation analysis found that fare evaders are
more likely to be young males and they will more likely choose to evade fares when the
average level of fare inspections are lower. Furthermore, Barbino et al. (2015) found that
fare evaders are more likely to be unemployed and have lower education levels. Based on
their results, the relationship between being unemployed and increased likelihood of fare
evasion could be associated with social bonds and stake in conformity. Fare evaders with
criminal records may have fewer social bonds and stake in conformity and therefore the
decision to evade is more prevalent.
In a study conducted by Bucciol, Landini, and Piovesan (2013), 541 bus
passengers on a transit system in Reggio Emilia, Italy were interviewed in an attempt to
examine the demographic profile that is correlated to fare evasion and unethical behavior.
Bucciol et al. (2013) analyzed factors such as employment status, income class, and selfreported attitudes on risk (the concern or non-concern of getting caught). Past fare
evasion was also analyzed and the researchers found results similar to those of Barbino et
al. (2015) in that young males are more likely to be fare evaders and fare evasion is more
likely to occur if the individual is unemployed (30.5%) but less likely to occur if the
individual is concerned about the risk of getting caught (-16.2%). However, Bucciol et al.
(2013) found no correlation effect between fare evasion and income or education and
only a 10.4% correlation effect between fare evasion and being previously fined. The
factors, employment status and attitudes of risk, analyzed by Barbino et al. (2015)
support the relationship between fare evaders, deterrence, rational choice, and social
bonds.
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In another qualitative study, Delbosc and Currie (2016) conducted 67 focus group
interviews and online discussion forums to understand the motivations and attitudes
toward fare evasion. Interviews were based on aspects of planned behavior such as
perceptions and attitudes about evasion, social norms, and influences of perceptions of
the cost and benefit of fare evasion. From the interviews, Delbosc and Currie (2016)
identified four types of fare evaders which include the accidental evader who believes
evasion is wrong, the “not my fault” evader who meant to pay but had complications, the
calculated risk taker evader who intentionally evades on occasion when the benefits seem
to outweigh the costs, and the career evader who almost always evades and takes pride. It
is important to acknowledge how clear intent to fare evade is critical when assessing
types of fare evaders (Delbosc & Currie, 2016). Particularly with the calculated risk-taker
type, the authors recognized risk takers as “gamblers” who tend to evade when they
perceived the probability of getting caught is lower. Risk takers also most commonly
decide to take the risk when they are only riding for “a few stops”. Career evaders also
take the risk when they believe they will not get caught however unlike the risk takers,
they never pay fares and accept the punishment of the fine (Delbosc & Currie, 2016).
Following this logic, repeat or career evaders could possibly decide to never pay fares or
fines because they anticipate no cost of getting caught and all the benefits of not paying.
Previous research has addressed the effectiveness of economic sanctions but there
is still a lack of research on predictors of compliance with court orders and economic
sanction payment. Within fare evasion literature, there are many studies that try to
understand the fare evader profile; however, many do not provide qualitative and
empirical information on convicted fare evaders with knowledge on their socio-
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demographic information (Barabino et al., 2015). The current study expands on
Renauer’s prior 2017 Tri-Met Examination of Fare Evasion and Fine Practices study by
including a measure of defendant criminal history to the potential factors that explain
payment versus non-payment. Exploring the factors that influence a defendant’s inability
to pay fines and failure to appear in court is essential for improving Tri-Met and other
public transportation system fare evasion policies.
Research Questions
RQ1: What demographic factors distinguish fare evaders who appear in court and pay
their fines from those who fail to appear and do not pay?
RQ2: Is there a relationship between fair evasion offenders who fail to appear in court
and do not pay fines and criminal history?
H1: Defendants who fail to appear in court and fail to pay fines are more likely to
have a criminal record than defendants who appear in court and pay 100% of their fees.
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Methodology
Data
The current study uses data from the Oregon Judicial Department, specifically
from the Multnomah County Circuit Court. The data set in this study contains all Tri-Met
public transportation fare evasion cases in court that were resolved and closed from June
of 2015 to January of 2017, an approximate two-year time period. Fare evasion citations,
along with the obligation to appear in court, were issued to people who were caught
riding a Tri-Met MAX or bus line without a validated ticket or proof of payment. The
data set contains information on whether the defendant showed up to court, the final fine
imposed, and how much of the fine was paid within at least 6 months of the disposition.
There was a total of 33,298 disposed cases in this data set.
The data set requested from the Multnomah County Circuit Court was originally
used for a national comparison and local analysis in Multnomah County. The previous
study was an examination of fare evasion and fine practices which aimed to explore
deterrence and the effect of punishment of fare evasion through court conviction and the
applied requirement to pay fines (Renauer, 2017). The current study expands on the
previous study by adding information on defendant criminal history to assess how it may
be connected to appearing in court and payment of fines. In addition, the current study
specifically focuses on contrasting and more thoroughly examining the demographic
characteristics of those who show up to court and pay fines compared to those who do
not.
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Sample
The data for this study focuses on two samples from the original data set. First,
the present study uses a sample of 24,646 fare evasion cases with all known relative
characteristics included (e.g. payments made, court appearance, repeat offenders, address,
and demographics) broken into two groups of fare evaders. Group one (n = 9,089)
includes cases where defendants appear in court and pay 100% of their fines referred to
as the “pay” or “payment” group. Group two (n = 15,557) includes cases where
defendants failed to appear in court and made no payments and are referred to as the “no
pay” or “non-payment” group. Excluded from the study and sample were those
defendants who failed to appear in court but paid 75% or more of their fine (n= 3,679)
and defendants who failed to appear in court and paid less than 75% of their fine. Also
excluded were those defendants who appeared in court and paid some but not all of their
fine (n= 121). There may have also been defendants who were not accounted for that
automatically paid their fine and did not need to appear in court. These subgroups were
excluded from the study because the aim was to examine the extreme fail to appear and
no pay versus appear and pay defendant cases.
A second sample was created out of groups one and two. This smaller subsample
of defendants was created to look up defendant criminal records. Through random
sampling, 200 defendants were selected from both group one and group two totaling a
sample of 400 defendants for the criminal history analysis.
From the random sample of 400 defendants selected from the payment and nonpayment group, a new variable was created containing information on the defendant’s
criminal history. Taking the defendant’s full name from the original data set, each
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defendant was put into the search box in the Oregon Judicial Department’s online records
smart search (website). Once the party search results came up, defendants with a
matching name were listed along with their date of birth, case number, file date, case
type, case status, and location. Defendants from the original data set were found in the
results list from the online records search and identified through their full names. The
match was confirmed by the defendant’s full name, date of birth, and case number of the
original violation which was provided by the original data set from Multnomah county. If
the date of birth was different or the middle initial was missing, those cases were not
considered to be the same defendant. Only historic case types that were noted as criminal
violations, misdemeanors, or felonies from the records search were coded. Case types
that were excluded and not coded were civil cases, specifically small claims contracts,
domestic relations filings, identity changes, and personal business cases. Traffic
infractions and municipal parking cases were also not included in the new data set
because they were differentiated in the Oregon Judicial Department’s online records and
were not recognized as criminal violations. A “Prior Offense Count” variable was added
to represent the amount of criminal record cases a defendant had before the original
violation, meaning that the original violation did not count towards the total. Some
defendants had exceptionally long criminal careers, so a decision was made to stop
counting prior criminal records after five records. The date of the most recent 5 criminal
cases was also recorded. The defendant criminal history was entered into a Microsoft
Excel sheet. The Excel sheet included a unique identifier associated with the defendant in
the original data set, offense information (i.e. felony or misdemeanor), and number of
offenses with the corresponding date. The criminal history data on the Excel sheet was
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imported into the IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software and
combined with the cleaned data set.
Measures
No Payment and Failure to Appear or Paid and Appeared. The dependent
variable in the current study is a dichotomous variable representing defendants who failed
to appear in court and made no payments toward their fare evasion fines and those fare
evasion defendants who appeared in court and paid 100% of their fine (Pay = 0; No Pay =
1).
Mean Prior Criminal Offense. This independent variable measures the criminal
offenses of those defendants who were issued a citation and ordered to appear in court for
fare evasion. This variable measures the mean number of prior criminal offenses (out of a
range from zero to five) that fare evasion defendants had prior to their current fare
evasion case. The count of criminal history ranged from zero to five or more offenses.
The variable was coded as 0 if the defendant had no prior offenses to the original Tri-Met
fare evasion after searching the Oregon Judicial Department’s online records.
Any Prior Criminal History. This variable also measures the criminal history of
those defendants who were issued a citation and ordered to appear in court for fare
evasion. However, this criminal history variable is dichotomized to indicate if a
defendant has any criminal history prior to the Tri-Met offense regardless of the count of
offenses (1 = Yes) or if a defendant has no prior criminal history in Oregon courts (0 =
No).
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Repeat Evasion. Defendants who have more than one fare evasion citation within
the two-year time period in this data set are considered repeat offenders. The repeat
offender variable is dichotomized (0= No, 1 = Yes).
High Repeat Evasion. Defendants who have four or more fare evasion citation
records in the original data set are considered high repeat offenders. The high repeat
offender variable is dichotomized (0 = No, 1 = Yes).
Count of Evasion Cases. This variable measures the count or raw amount of fare
evasion citations each defendant has received within the original data set. The count is
used to compare and determine which measures of fare evasion factors are better
predictors of non-payment and failure to appear.
Months to 1st Prior Criminal Offense. This variable measures the number of
months between the most recent prior criminal offense documented and the original TriMet fare evasion citation date. The time in months from the most recent criminal offenses
prior to the Tri-Met fare evasion citation was measured by finding the amount of days
between the offenses and dividing by 30.
Live in PDX (Portland). This variable measures whether or not the defendant
lives in Portland, Oregon (1 = Yes, 0 = No) or if the defendant lives in another city and
state. The “Live in PDX” variable helps determine if defendants who reside out of town
are less likely to pay perhaps because they are less likely to be concerned about the
ramifications of not showing up to court and paying fines.
Repeat Address (Shelter Address). The “Repeat Address” variable is a proxy
measure of fare evasion defendants who are houseless, residing in homeless shelters, or
are receiving services from local crisis and rehabilitative service organizations. The
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“Shelter Address” variable is dichotomized (0 = No, 1 = Yes). In the original data set and
study, Renauer (2017) found in a frequency distribution of addresses that some addresses
had a high frequency of being reported by multiple defendants. After searching for these
high frequency addresses reported by multiple defendants in Google maps, they were
found to be addresses to local homeless shelters and rehabilitation centers. The “Repeat
Address” variable could also serve as a measure for socioeconomic status.
Demographics. The sex, race, and age of the fare evasion defendants are also
analyzed. Sex is coded dichotomously (1 = male, 0 = female). Race is separated into two
different variables, African American and Non-White, as it was in the original data set
(Renauer, 2017). The African American variable is dichotomized (1 = African American,
0 = Not African American) and the Non-White variable is also dichotomized (1 = NonWhite, 0 = White). The defendant age is a continuous variable.
Analytical Strategies
In the current study, the relationship between defendants with a criminal record
and defendants who did not pay and failed to appear in court or paid is analyzed. In order
to understand the relationship between defendants with criminal histories and defendants
who do not pay and fail to appear in court or defendants who pay and appear in court, an
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted for the sample of 24,646 pay and no pay
defendants across all variables. The ANOVA model shows the average differences
between the defendants who did not pay and failed to appear in court (n = 15,557) and the
defendants who paid and appeared in court (n = 9,089) across all variables at the p<.001
level. An additional ANOVA was conducted on the subsample of 400 fare evasion
defendants taken from the pay group (n = 200) and no pay group (n = 200) at the p<.001
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level across the criminal history variables (i.e. any prior criminal history, mean prior
criminal offenses, and months to 1st prior criminal offense). Initial frequencies were also
conducted on the subsample across all variables. To test the hypothesis and the factors
most associated with non-payment and failure to appear, a binary logistic regression was
conducted to examine whether defendants who do not to pay and fail to appear in court
are more likely to have a criminal record than those defendants who show up in court and
pay 100% of their fees. The logistic regression model shows the odds ratio or
proportionate change between criminal history and defendants who do not pay their fines
and fail to appear in court along with other variables relating to non-payment. All
analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS statistical software. Furthermore, a deeper
qualitative analysis on the no pay and failure to appear group was conducted using the
criminal record research, offense types, and offense details.
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Results
Comparing Means between Groups in Original Sample
In the current study, the sample was divided into two groups by offenders who
appeared in court and paid all of their fine (n = 9,089) and by offenders who failed to
appear in court and did not make any payments toward their fine (n = 15,557). An
analysis of variance or ANOVA was conducted for the original dataset with the 24,646
cases in order to find the differences in means between the no pay and pay group at the
p<.001 level (see Table 1). In the ANOVA model, the mean differences between the
groups in all variables were significant. When looking at repeat offenders, defendants that
have other fare evasion cases within the data set, there was a statistically significant
difference in means between the group of defendants who paid and appeared in court
(10.5%) and the group of defendants who did not pay and failed to appear (39.0%) at the
p<.001 level (F=2,580.616, sig=.000). There was a marginally low but statistically
significant difference (sig=.000) regarding high repeat offenders (defendants with a count
of four or more fare evasion offenses) between the pay group (0.5%) and the no pay
group (11.5%) with an F statistic of 1,084.337. There was also a small yet significant
difference (sig=.000) between the means of the pay group (1.13) and the no pay group
(1.91) when considering the count of defendant fare evasion citations during the study
timeframe (F=1,904.993). Surprisingly, there was a significant difference (.000) between
the age of the groups with the no pay group having a mean age of 34.9 and the pay group
having a mean of 31.3 (F=520.137). The mean of sex between the groups was statistically
different (.000) with the no pay group having 71.9% males and the pay group having
56.2% males. There were significant differences between the means of groups (.000)
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regarding race with African American defendants representing 22.7% of the no pay group
and 7.9% of the pay group (F=932.418) and with Non-White defendants representing
35.4% of the no pay group and 28.6% of the pay group (F=144.69). In regard to the
repeat addresses or shelter addresses that were listed multiple times, there was a large
difference between the means of the pay group (1.7%) and the no pay group (29.7%)
where defendants reported a homeless shelter or rehabilitation facility address
(F=3410.167, sig=.000). The comparison of means between the no pay and pay groups in
the original sample provides a premise for the analyses of variances explored later in the
current study.
Table 1. ANOVA Results by No Pay and Pay Groups
Variable
Repeat Evasion
High Repeat Evasion
Count of Evasion Cases
Age (continuous)
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55+
Sex (Male)
African American
Non-White
Repeat Address (Shelter Address)

Mean of Pay (N=9,089)
10.5%
0.5%
1.1
31.3
37.6%
33.1%
13.6%
8.5%
7.2%
56.2%
7.9%
28.6%
1.7%

Mean of No Pay (N=16,295)
39.0%
11.5%
1.9
34.9
22.7%
32.5%
21.3%
15.1%
8.3%
71.9%
22.7%
35.4%
29.7%

F
2580.616
1084.337
1904.993
520.137

p
.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***

667.233
932.418
144.69
3410.167

.000***
.000***
.000***
.000***

Note: p<.001***

ANOVA on Criminal History
From the original sample of 24,646 pay and no pay defendants, a random sample
of 200 defendants was taken from the pay and no pay groups for a refined sample of 400
fare evasion defendants. The criminal histories for the sample of 400 defendants were
accessed through a publicly open web portal provided by the Oregon Judicial
Department. The primary question this study seeks to examine is whether criminal
history is related to not showing up in court and not paying fare evasion fines or to
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showing up and paying. Frequency analyses were conducted on the pay and no pay
groups to show the count and percentage differences between the two groups (see
Appendix A). An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to examine the mean
difference in criminal histories between the group that paid their fine and appeared in
court (N=200) and the group that did not pay and failed to appear in court (N=200) across
criminal history related variables at the p<.001 level (see Table 2). When comparing the
pay and no pay group regarding whether or not defendants have had any prior offense
before the original Tri-Met citation, there was a statistically large difference in the means
between the two groups. Out of the no pay and failure to appear group, 55.0% of
defendants had a criminal history compared to only 16.0% of defendants that paid and
showed up to court (F=79.873, sig=.000). There was a statistically significant difference
between defendants who paid and did not pay based on the average or mean of prior
criminal offenses before the Tri-Met fare evasion case with the no pay group having a
mean of 1.94 prior criminal offenses and the pay group having a mean of 0.30 (F=98.592,
sig=.000). When accounting for the number of prior offenses, 45.5% of defendants in the
no pay group had zero prior offenses while 84.5% in the pay group had zero prior
offenses. There were differences between the defendants in the no pay and pay groups
who had one, two, three, and four prior offenses. However, there was a larger difference
between defendants in the two groups with 29.0% of defendants in the no pay group
having five or more prior offenses and only 1.0% of defendants in the pay group having
five or more prior offenses. There was also a significant difference between groups when
accounting for the mean number of months between their most recent criminal offense
and the fare evasion offense with the no pay group having a mean of 23.8 months and the
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pay group having a mean of 59.7 months (F=18.608, sig=.000). The number of months
were grouped into categories beginning with less than a month, one to three, four to six,
seven to nine, ten to twelve, and thirteen and over months. There were differences for
each of the month categories with notable differences at one to three months between the
no pay group (24.6%) and the pay group (6.5%) and at thirteen and over months with the
no pay group having 42.2% and the pay group having 77.4%.
Table 2. ANOVA Results for Criminal History by No Pay and Pay Groups
Variable
Any Prior Criminal History
Mean Prior Criminal Offenses
0 Prior Offenses
1 Prior Offense
2 Prior Offenses
3 Prioir Offenses
4 Prior Offenses
5+ Prior Offenses
Months to 1st Prior Criminal Offense
< 1 mo.
1-3 mo.
4-6 mo.
7-9 mo.
10-12 mo.
13+ mo.

Mean of Pay (N=200)
16.0%
0.30
84.5%
8.0%
4.0%
1.5%
1.0%
1.0%
59.7
6.5%
6.5%
9.7%
0.0%
0.0%
77.4%

Mean of No Pay (N=200)
55.0%
1.94
45.5%
13.0%
5.5%
3.5%
3.5%
29.0%
23.8
11.9%
24.6%
11.0%
5.5%
4.6%
42.2%

F
79.873
98.592

p
.000***
.000***

18.608

.000***

Note: p<.001***

Regression on FTA and Non-Payment Group with Prior Criminal History
Defendants in the no pay and failure to appear group were hypothesized to be
more likely have a criminal record than defendants in the pay group. A binary logistic
regression was conducted with “No Pay and Failure to Appear” as the dependent variable
and the factors most associated with no pay and failure to appear as the independent
variables to compare this group to the pay group (see Table 3). Results from the
regression show that the strongest variable related to non-payment and failure to appear
in court is the repeat or shelter address proxy measure with an odds ratio of 128.695 and a
standard deviation of 1.031 (sig=.000). When considering the effect size of repeat
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addresses, the findings indicate that defendants who do not pay their fines and fail to
appear in court are almost 129 times (128.695) more likely to report living in a shelter
address than defendants who pay and appear in court. The second strongest variable
related to the no pay and failure to appear group is the any prior criminal history
measure with an odds ratio of 5.281 and a standard error of 0.294 (sig=.000). Defendants
in the no pay and fail to appear group are a little over five times (5.3) more likely to have
a prior criminal history than the defendants in the pay group. Also significant at the
p<.001 level was the repeat fare evasion variable with an odds ratio of 3.843 and a
standard error of 0.345 (sig=.000). Defendants in the no pay group are about four times
(3.8) more likely to have had repeat fare evasion cases than the defendants in the pay
group. Significant at the p<.01 level, the Non-White variable had an odds ratio of 2.503
and a standard error of 0.284 (sig=.001). The Non-White variable suggests that
defendants in the no pay group are two and a half times (2.5) more likely to not be White
than the defendants in the pay group. The variables that were not significant were age
(.339), sex (.335), and live in Portland (.593).
Table 3. Logistic Regression on Prior Criminal Offenses and No Pay
Control
Any Prior Criminal History
Age (continuous)
Repeat Address (Shelter Address)
Live in PDX
Non-White
Repeat Evasion
Sex (Male)
Constant
Note: p<.05*, p<.01**, p<.001***

B
1.664
0.010
4.857
0.151
0.917
1.346
0.278
-2.273

S.E.
0.294
0.011
1.031
0.283
0.284
0.345
0.288
0.473

Wald
31.946
0.915
22.177
0.285
10.454
12.184
0.929
23.101

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.000***
.339
.000***
.593
.001**
.000***
.335
.000

O.R.
5.281
1.01
128.695
1.163
2.503
3.843
1.32
0.103

95% C.I.
[2.96 - 9.405]
[0.99 - 1.03]
[17.04 - 971.72]
[0.67 - 2.03]
[1.44 - 4.36]
[1.95 - 7.56]
[0.76 - 2.32]

Qualitative Information on FTA and No Pay Offenders
The current study aims to assess disparities in fare evasion cases by exploring
criminal records of defendants who do not pay their fines and fail to appear in court. To

27
get a more in-depth picture of how criminal history relates to non-payment, the criminal
records of five random defendants from the no pay and failure to appear group with five
or more prior offenses were examined. One defendant, identified as defendant 208 in the
data set, had prior offenses that not only included multiple “Offense Violation” cases, but
also multiple “Offense Misdemeanor” and “Offense Felony” cases dating from recent
years to back before 2000. Some of defendant 208’s cases include misdemeanors for
having alcohol in the park and harassment, misdemeanors for interfering with public
transport, disorderly conduct, and offensive littering, and felony cases for possession of
cocaine.
Another defendant with the identifying number 349 has had numerous
misdemeanor and felony cases within the last five years including class B and C felony
cases for possession and distribution of methamphetamine, misdemeanors for having
alcohol on public property, and misdemeanors for offensive littering. A third defendant,
identified as 364, has had misdemeanor cases for disorderly conduct and interfering with
peace and parole, harassment disorderly conduct in the second degree, felony cases for
burglary in the first degree, assault in the fourth degree, and criminal mischief in the
second degree. Defendant 370 has had multiple misdemeanors and felony cases within
one-year time frames. Defendant 370, for example, had two separate misdemeanors, both
for possession of cocaine with only a three-month time period in between cases.
Defendant 370 also had felony cases for possession of controlled substances and criminal
trespassing.
Some defendants with multiple prior offenses however did not have felony or
misdemeanor cases on their record. Instead, some defendants were convicted multiple
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times of only fare evasion. For example, defendant number 393 was convicted of fare
evasion because they had no proof of payment several times between 2011 and 2016.
Overall, all the defendants whose online criminal records were examined have had
multiple previous offense violations for fare evasion and most had more serious offenses
on their records as well. Furthermore, all the examined defendants had similar cases or
even identical repeated charges like drug and social disorder related offenses.
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Discussion
The current study aimed to examine the relationship between fare evasion
defendants who do not pay their fines and fail to appear in court and fare evasion
defendants who do pay and appear in court in relation to their criminal histories. The
study also aimed to understand the factors that better distinguish fare evaders who do not
pay and fail to appear. An ANOVA comparing prior criminal history between the two
groups showed a large difference between the pay and no pay group was apparent. The
largest difference between the groups was the mean of prior criminal offenses where the
pay group had a mean of 0.30 and the no pay group had a mean of 1.94 criminal offenses
with a significance of .000 (F=98.592, p<.001). Out of the 200 defendants in the no pay
group, over half of them had one to five or more prior criminal offenses. More notable,
13.0% of no pay defendants had only one offense and 29.0% had at least five or more
prior criminal offenses compared to the pay group where only 8.0% had one prior
offense and only 1.0% of defendants had five or more. The timeline of prior offenses
could also be telling of a defendant's general deviant behavior. Out of the 109 defendants
in the no pay group with any prior offense, 11.9% of those defendants had a prior offense
on their criminal record within less than a month, 24.6% of them within one to three
months, 11.0% of them within four to six months, 5.5% of them within seven to nine
months, 4.6% of them within ten to twelve months, and 42.2% of them within thirteen
months or more. Moreover, these findings coincide with the results reported by the
logistic regression which suggest that defendants in the no pay and failure to appear
group are 5.3 times more likely to have a prior criminal offense than the defendants in the
pay and appear group. Cools et al. (2018) mentioned that from their sample of 636 survey
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respondents, more than 25% of people in the entire sample have had at least one prior
fare evasion citation and when compared to the current study, that amount is nearly
doubled with 41.5% of defendants in the no pay group being repeat fare evaders with at
least one prior fare evasion citation. Based on their results, Cools et al. (2018) mentioned
that very few factors help in predicting the profile of a fare evader. However, the current
study found support in the identification of criminal records in addition to repeat fare
evasion as a predicting factor of fare evasion, non-payment, and failure to appear in
court. Criminal history could be an indicator of non-payment of fines and failure to
appear in court because of cumulative disadvantages, differing rational thinking, and lack
of stake in conformity. Moreover, those defendants with criminal histories and those in
the no pay and failure to appear group who also were repeat offenders show that specific
deterrence has little to no preventive effect on future evasion. Being that some defendants
with a criminal record could be financially disadvantaged or have hardships such as
substance abuse (37.0% listed a shelter address), they are reluctant to pay a fare let alone
a fine in a higher monetary range. The defendants belonging to this population may
perceive the benefits of not paying to outweigh the costs because they have little to
nothing to lose. Furthermore, with no potential costs defendants are also likely to have
little personal capital within society. Subsequently, the defendants in the no pay and FTA
group are not deterred by existing transit system fare enforcement policies because their
perceptions of severe and certain punishment are likely muted through the disadvantages
and day-to-day obstacles they face.
The statistical differences in the means of demographic variables for the
defendants in the no pay group and the pay group were all significant according to the
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ANOVAs. The significant demographic variables include living in shelters, repeat fare
evasion, and race. Previous studies have found that fare evasion defendants are usually
young males and though there were significant differences between the means in age and
sex of the defendants in both groups as well, that might have been because of random
sampling. However, race was significant in the logistic regression suggesting that
defendants in the no pay group are 2.5 times more likely to be Non-White than
defendants in the pay group. Some notable findings were that the defendants from the no
pay group who listed a repeat address had a mean of 29.7% while the pay group
defendants who listed a repeat address had a mean of 1.7%. The logistic regression
showed that no pay defendants who listed a repeat address were 128.7 times more likely
to have any prior criminal history than the pay defendants who listed a repeat address.
Results indicate that at least one third of the no pay fare evasion defendants with a
criminal history have been associated with a homeless shelter or a rehabilitation center.
The hardships of this population that could lead to differences in rational decisionmaking could be explained by cumulative disadvantages. Accumulating hardships that
minority (Non-White) and homeless populations experience can be attributed to their
social and economic statuses. Experiencing homelessness, drug and alcohol abuse, and
even mental health issues may influence defendant reasoning in favor of fare evasion,
non-payment of fees, and failure to appear in court. After defendant rational thinking and
stake in conformity is compromised, they are less likely to be concerned by deterrencebased policies regardless of punishment severity, certainty, and celerity. This is especially
true for those defendants who are repeat offenders and have criminal histories as the
experience of being punished, specific deterrence, has no effect on future offending.
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When selected at random, the no pay and failure to appear group defendants had
similar criminal offenses or types on their record. The defendants whose criminal
backgrounds were further investigated had offenses that are more serious than fare
evasion, including misdemeanors and felonies. Not only were the offenses more serious,
but there were several criminal offenses that all occurred months apart over the last
several years. With the accumulating convictions and court fees, it is likely that these
defendants would give little importance to initially paying a fare, paying a fare evasion
citation, or even appearing in court for a fare evasion violation. As generally mentioned
by criminological studies, Clarke et al. (2010) also suggested that it is possible that a
small number of individuals are responsible for multiple or a larger amount of the fare
evasion cases. Therefore, in the current study, it is possible that the individuals
responsible for a large amount of the fare evasion cases could be a few defendants in the
no pay group with a criminal record in combination with other factors. The information
from a deeper analysis into a few defendant criminal records is exemplary of how general
and specific deterrent based polices do not function for the no pay, failure to appear, and
repeat evading population. The defendants in this group might also be likely to fail to
appear in court and pay their fees because of lack of stake in conformity and social
bonds. Given the severity and amount of criminal records these defendants had on their
criminal histories, it is likely that they are not personally invested into social and
conventional norms. These particular defendants were heavily involved in more serious
types of criminal activity where the risks are costlier suggesting their rational thinking
leads them to disregard any repercussion or costs. Moreover, the qualitative information
also shows that these no pay defendants with prior criminal histories have records for
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crimes involving illicit drug and alcohol consumption or handling. This supports the
suggestion that mental health or substance abuse by defendants may add to existing
cumulative disadvantages and influence rational decision making.
The analyses in their entirety show that there is a fundamental difference between
fare evaders who pay and appear in court and fare evaders who do not pay and fail to
appear in court. The differences in means between the pay and no pay groups and the
nature of some of the no pay fare evaders’ criminal records suggest that those who do not
pay their fines and do not appear in court are more likely to have committed similar acts
before and will continue. Factors relating to prior criminal offenses, homelessness or low
socioeconomic status, repeat fare evasion, and even race are associated with defendant
likelihood of failing to appear in court and not paying their fees. Therefore, the
hypothesis that defendants who fail to appear in court and fail to pay fares and fees are
more likely to have a criminal record than defendants who show up in court and pay their
fees is accepted based on the results of this study.
Policy Implications
Though the possibility for fare evasion increased with self-service or honor
system programs, revenue could be made from fines or citations given to fare evaders by
fare inspectors (Fox, 1982). Also, the costs of auditing all fares outweighs the labor costs
of fare inspectors (Boyd, 1989). The problem with fare inspectors however, is that it is
the costliest form of fare evasion inspection or control (Fox, 1982). While increased
inspection would increase revenue in fares, it would also increase cost in inspector
enforcement (Boyd, 1989). The increase in revenue with increased fare citations from
inspectors also assumes that individuals will pay those fines. The findings in the study
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conducted by Bucciol et al., (2013) and the results from the current study suggest that
increasing fares and fines would not increase transit system revenues at least with fare
evaders like the defendants in the target sample in the current study. Remember that only
30% of fare evaders over a two-year time period actually paid their fine in full after six
months in the original data set (Renauer, 2017). Those people who are not paying their
fines, as portrayed by the sample and results from the current study, are mostly repeat
fare evaders, have criminal records, and suffer from housing or other crisis issues. In a
report made to assess the deterrent effect of increasing the issuance of fare evasion fines
in a transit system in Canada, Clarke, Contre, and Petrossian (2010) suggested that when
deciding to commit fare evasion, an individual considers the certainty of being caught
more heavily than the severity (price) of the punishment. However, if the severity of
punishment is increased, then fare evasion would likely also decrease. Clarke et al.
(2010) suggested refining policy around repeat offenders like the individuals in the
current study’s target sample. Cools et al. (2018) suggested directing enforcement around
individuals in the “younger” age range with methods such as promoting information on
the fare evasion processes.
The findings from the current study show that policy regarding fare enforcement
and fare evasion citations should change. Tri-Met has one of the costliest fare fines in the
country (Renuaer, 2017); however, results show that these high fare evasion fines are not
effective for approximately 70% of fare evaders and are especially ineffective with the
individuals who have had prior criminal histories, are repeat fare evaders, and who are
homeless. The defendants belonging to these particular groups are likely to not pay their
fines and appear in court regardless of higher fine amounts and other repercussions. Some
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reasons why fare evaders might not pay the appropriate fare could be attributed to their
disadvantages such as homelessness, substance abuse issues, or financial hardships.
While Tri-Met does have reduced fare programs for low income riders, some individuals
may not be able to pay fares for every ride. Riding payment plans may also not be
effective with this population either and could end in debt and collections. Giving this
population “free” passes would be costly to Tri-Met, but also raise fairness concerns with
passengers who do pay the appropriate fares or fines. Further research should be
conducted to understand fare evasion and riding purposes among the chronic fare evading
population. Additional research on public opinion of fare evasion, experiences on the
MAX, and reduced fare programs could help Tri-Met shape policy discussions too.
Limitations
To ensure the quality and validity of the research, the current study was carefully
conducted, organized, and executed, however there were some limitations. Ultimately,
this particular study is specific to Oregon’s Multnomah County Judicial Department, the
tri-county metropolitan area, and their Tri-Met transit system. The predictive factors and
relative results or indications are specific to this urban setting, but they still may be
applicable to other cities, states, countries, or even other types of transit systems. Specific
to the present study’s setting are administrative processes, court processes, and the fine
amounts imposed. The way that citations are issued by the transit system, the way cases
are disposed, the way sanctions are imposed in courts, and the amount in fine ranges that
are applied could produce different but similar dynamics of fare evasion, fine, and court
outcomes. Furthermore, the specific demographics and socioeconomic statuses of the
population who use the Tri-Met transit systems differ from other areas and regions but
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findings may be applicable. All of these factors may have influenced the results of the
study and affected its generalizability; however, the findings still contribute to fare
evasion scholarship.
Another limitation to the current study was the limited information on defendant
criminal offenses. Although criminal records are public information which are accessible
through the internet, there still may be some information missing from cases listed online.
When searching for certain cases or a defendant’s name, some case descriptions are
minimal, or case dockets are missing. This prevents a deeper analysis of individual cases
when examining defendant criminal records. Though more information on defendant
cases and their criminal records would have been useful, knowing the nature of defendant
cases provided enough qualitative information for the purpose of the current study. Each
defendant’s criminal record search provided search results with all known cases, criminal
offense types (i.e. felony, misdemeanor), offense descriptions, and some details such as
dates, locations, case statuses, charge statues and levels, disposition events, etc.
Therefore, enough information on each case was accessible to interpret defendant
criminal records.
Though the original full data set contains personal and identifying information,
there was also some uncertainty about defendant to case association. Using information
such as a full name, date of birth, and case numbers, a defendant could be “smart”
searched in the court’s online records. Results will display a list of defendants and their
previous offenses matching the search information entered. However, it is common that
an individual defendant will be listed multiple times in separate entries. According to
Multnomah County court clerks, the reason why an individual defendant can be listed
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multiple times is because of file entry coding error or misconnection. When clerks input
cases into the online court records and defendants have multiple cases, the clerks do not
make the association and they enter the defendant as a new entry. This made it possible
for different defendants to appear in the search results list. However, Multnomah County
court clerks also stated that when searching a defendant with multiple entries, the single
defendant can be associated with different entries by matching full names and dates of
birth. When searching and coding defendant criminal records in the current study, each
case entry was cross checked with full names and dates of birth to ensure they were the
same defendant.
A major limitation to the present study is the missing factor of defendant
socioeconomic and financial status. The listed address of defendants is available in the
original data set; however, the addresses were not used for neighborhood analyses in the
current study. A more qualitative approach that focuses on the personal and
socioeconomic information of the sample or participants would be the appropriate and
only adequate form of obtaining the richest information. Instead, in the current study the
repeat or “shelter” address was incorporated to examine the relationship between those
defendants who do not pay their fines and fail to appear in court and who also listed an
address of a homeless shelter or rehabilitation center. This created a more predictive
factor that supplements defendant socioeconomic status. Though the present study had
limitations, the findings still are empirically valuable additions to the growing literature
on fare evasion.
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Suggestions for Future Research
As previously mentioned, there are qualitative methods in which scholars could
add to the current literature (Delbosc & Currie, 2016). Having qualitative information on
defendant or fare evader socioeconomic status would make for a better predictive study
in which factors of nonpayment and failure to appear in court could be examined. For
example, fare evasion defendants could complete surveys or participate in interviews
where their responses show reasoning for nonpayment or failing to appear in court.
Questions in the survey or interviews could also inquire participants about their
preferences on administrative processes, court processes, or even suggestions on
preventing fare evasion. Observations in a natural experiment on the interactions between
fare evasion inspectors and passengers with or without proof of payment would also
bring contributions to this area of research (Bucciol et al., 2013). Making sense of the
qualitative responses would create a better understanding of fare evasion. For the purpose
of policy improvement, future research could lead in the direction of fare evader riding
purposes. Regardless of failure to appear in court and nonpayment, knowing the purpose
of riding or passenger destinations could be telling of intentional fare evasion. Passengers
may be willing to ride without the appropriate fare because they need to be at a
destination and just cannot afford paying. Some may just be “joy riding” to pass the time
or may use transportation for transitions between criminal activity. Investigating the
reasons or situational factors for fare evasion might help alleviate fare evasion. These
predictive studies with qualitative strategic approaches could help inform policy making
and anticipate policy effectiveness. Being that the recent literature is focused on finding
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solutions to fare evasion without the heavy use of economic sanctions (Barabino et al.,
2015), the direction of future research could heavily rely on these methods.
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Appendix
Table 4. Frequencies for Pay and No Pay Groups
Pay and Appeared
Variable

f

%

No Pay and Failed to Appear
f

%

Any Prior Criminal History
Repeat Evasion
High Repeat Evasion
Count of Evasion Cases
Sex (Male)
African American
Non-White
Live in PDX
Repeat Address (Shelter Address)
Months to 1st Prior Criminal Offense
< 1 mo.
1-3 mo.
4-6 mo.
7-9 mo.
10-12 mo.
13+ mo.
Age
18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55+

31
18
1
18
117
18
52
125
1

15.5%
9.0%
0.5%
9.0%
58.5%
9.0%
26.0%
62.5%
0.5%

109
83
20
83
145
52
86
156
74

54.5%
41.5%
10.0%
41.5%
72.5%
26.0%
43.0%
78.0%
37.0%

0
2
2
0
0
24

6.5%
6.5%
9.7%
0.0%
0.0%
77.4%

12
18
17
9
3
49

11.9%
24.6%
11.0%
5.5%
4.6%
42.2%

63
74
29
20
14

31.5%
37.0%
14.5%
10.0%
7.0%

45
63
40
31
21

22.5%
31.5%
20.0%
15.5%
10.5%

Total

200

200

